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The EUWAB-project (European Union Welfare Effects of Agricultural Biotechnology) 
http://www.agr.kuleuven.ac.be/aee/clo/euwab.htm 
Since 1995, genetically modified organisms have been 
introduced commercially into US agriculture. These 
innovations are developed and commercialised by a 
handful of vertically coordinated “life science” firms who 
have fundamentally altered the structure of the seed 
industry. Enforcement of intellectual property rights for 
biological innovations has been the major incentive for 
a concentration tendency in the upstream sector. Due 
to their monopoly power, these firms are capable of 
charging a “monopoly rent”, extracting a part of the 
total social welfare. In the US, the first ex post welfare 
studies reveal that farmers and input suppliers are receiving the largest part of the benefits. 
However, up to now no parallel ex ante study has been published for the European Union. 
Hence, the EUWAB-project (European Union Welfare effects of Agricultural Biotechnology) 
aims at calculating the total benefits of selected agricultural biotechnology innovations in the 
EU and their distribution among member countries, producers, processors, consumers, input 
suppliers and government. This project (VIB/TA-OP/98-07) is financed by the VIB - Flanders 
Interuniversitary Institute for Biotechnology, in the framework of its Technology Assessment 
Programme. VIB is an autonomous biotech research institute, founded in 1995 by the 
Government of Flanders. It combines 9 university departments and 5 
associated laboratories. More than 750 researchers and technicians are 
active within various areas of biotech research. VIB has three major 
objectives: to perform high quality research, to validate research results and 
technology and to stimulate a well-structured social dialogue on 
biotechnology. Address: VIB vzw, Rijvisschestraat 120, B-9052 Gent, 
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  2 Introduction 
The EUWAB-project (European Union Welfare effects of Agricultural 
Biotechnology) aims at calculating the total benefits of agricultural biotechnology 
innovations in the EU and their distribution among member countries, producers, 
processors, consumers, input suppliers and government. The present document 
summarizes the major comments and replies stemming from two evaluation 
workshops that have been held on the 19
th of June 2002 in Leuven (K.U.Leuven), and 
the 4
th of July 2002 in Tienen (IRBAB-KBIVB). Reviewers and discussants were 
Jozef Claes (Boerenbond), René Custers (VIB), José Falck-Zepeda (ISNAR), Olivier 
Hermann (IRBAB-KBIVB), Thierry Merckling (Monsanto), Jean-François Misonne 
(IRBAB-KBIVB), Marc Rosiers (SUBEL), and Johan De Rijcker (Tiense Suiker). 
The reviewed EUWAB working papers are Demont and Tollens (2002) and De 
Venter et al. (2002). 
 
The Sugar Sector as Case Study 
One of our arguments in choosing the sugar sector as a relevant case study is the fact 
that sugar is an important export commodity in EU agriculture. As one of the 
reviewers correctly pointed out, an apparent contradiction emerges in Demont and 
Tollens (2002). However, we will show that this contradiction is only apparent. In the 
paper we argued that the majority of EU countries produce out-of-quota C-sugar as a 
precautionary act in order to fulfil its allocated quotas. In literature, only four 
countries (France, Germany, Austria, and the UK) are considered to respond 
significantly to world market prices (Frandsen et al., 2001). Moreover, for the first 
group of countries this C-sugar production is in most of the years not profitable. Does 
this mean that sugar is not an important export commodity in the EU?  Important to 
  3note is that C-sugar is only a part of total EU sugar exports. Historically, sugar quotas 
have been set at a level that is superior to domestic consumption. This means that a 
part of B-quota sugar is also exported on the world market: Qd in Figure 1 in (Demont 
and Tollens, 2002). Moreover, a part of the preferential imports from ACP-countries 
is re-exported on the world market, adding to total EU exports. Hence, there is no 
contradiction between the individual countries’ low C-sugar response on world prices 
and the importance of EU sugar exports. 
 
Another argument for a study on the EU sugar sector is the assumption that the 
acceptance of sugar produced from GM beets is ‘realistic’. This assumption was 
commented to be ‘unrealistic’, since consumers will not accept the product as long as 
they do not see any functional (health, convenience, environment, etc.) advantage, 
independent of price. Our argument has to be interpreted as a relative one. Initially, in 
setting up our case studies we thought GM sugar to be less prone of consumer 
opposition since no genes nor traces of proteins can be found in this pure product, in 
comparison with the other relevant case studies (e.g. Bt maize). Moreover, the 
existence of a real observable consumer response to GM labels is still unproven 
(Noussair et al., 2002, Marks et al., 2002). 
 
The sugar industry appears to be the major factor in the refusal of GM sugar beets. 
Our model (Demont and Tollens, 2002) and   in the remainder of this paper 
show that hardly any benefit is being passed on to processors. Even in the US, the 
marketing concerns of sugar processors are a significant roadblock to the introduction 
of GM sugar beets, since Europe and Japan are reluctant to accept GM pulp from 
beets (Lilleboe, 2000). One of the reviewers correctly adds that the competition with 
Figure 1
  4 sugar cane is one of the driving forces in this behaviour. Sugar cane has the image of 
being ‘the organic alternative sweetener’. Sugar cane and sugar beet account for 
respectively 71% and 29% of global sugar production (Demont and Tollens, 2002). 
Any bad image could quickly result in a loss of market share caused by consumers 
shifting from ‘industrial’ beet sugar to cane sugar, perceived as more ‘natural’. It is 
clear that, in the absence of benefits, the sugar industry would not accept such a risk. 
 
The EU’s Impact on World Sugar Prices 
In this context, reference was made to Brazil. In the first place, Brazil is a producer of 
energy (electricity and ethanol) from sugar, while sugar itself is a by-product. This 
producer would have a larger impact on world market prices than the EU. Our five-
year averages reported in Table 1 (Demont and Tollens, 2002), however indicate an 
equal presence between these two producers, each responsible for 20% of global 
traded sugar. Moreover, econometric analyses by the FAPRI (Food And Policy 
Research Institute, Missouri) show the important influence of EU sugar exports on 
world sugar prices (Poonyth, 1998, Poonyth et al., 2000). The importance of ethanol 
for Brazil’s sugar production is consistent with Devadoss and Kropf (1996), who find 
a large cross price elasticity of -0.619 for sugar production in response to ethanol 
prices. 
 
In De Venter et al. (2002), we do not take into account the effects of a declining 
world price (due to the technology) on the individual producer. Does this mean that 
we deny the importance of the EU as a sugar exporter?  Do we have a contradiction 
here?  The answer is ‘aggregation’. In a micro-economic analysis, some factors such 
as price declines can be reasonable assumed zero. For an individual Belgian producer, 
  5the effect of a declining price of his C-production, due to biotechnology adoption, is 
small. Once we start aggregating all effects stemming from the technology and 
distributing them to different stakeholders, we cannot deny even such small price 
changes. In this respect, macro-economic reasoning is different from micro-economic 
reasoning. 
 
The EU’s Common Market Organization (CMO) for Sugar 
Another comment states that carrying out welfare analyses in imperfect markets, such 
as the EU Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar, is prone for measurement 
errors if the model assumes a perfect market. This is a valid argument. However, our 
model has been adapted to include this market intervention and focuses entirely on the 
consequences of this market imperfection on the returns to biotechnology R&D. This 
methodology has been widely accepted in literature (Alston et al., 1995). 
 
Our economic view on the CMO as an ‘inert regime’, that has withstood any 
substantial reform since 1968, has been criticized. However, the arguments focus on 
the sugar sector as a whole that has been able to adapt itself to the changing market 
environment. Our view is only limited to the CMO sugar as a commodity policy 
(quotas, fixed prices, etc.), where essentially little change has been recorded for a long 
period, although we fully acknowledge that the underlying sector adjustment to this 
policy has been very dynamic (Demont and Tollens, 2001b). Regarding De Venter et 
al. (2002), questions have been raised about the relevance of an extensive literature 
review regarding the EU’s CMO for sugar. We agree that questions about the 
economic efficiency in terms of welfare of the CMO are not within the scope of the 
paper. However, since profitability in the beet sector is directly associated with the 
  6 setup of the CMO for sugar, the latter will also influence the profitability of new 
technologies, such as agricultural biotechnology. Therefore, description and inclusion 
of this regulatory framework is essential for our study. 
 
Reference has been made to a study carried out by Idea Consult (1999), in which the 
CMO is showed to be a second best policy instrument favouring price stability and 
security of supply, limiting welfare losses due to market interventions. This 
discussion is beyond the scope of our study. However, we want to point out that a vast 
collection of literature covers this topic, starting in 1987 (Sudaryanto, 1987), showing 
how the benefits from liberalizing world sugar trade are distributed among different 
stakeholders. We also want to warn for the fact that the effect of liberalizing trade on 
price stability is not conclusive in literature. Borrell (1999) argues that liberalization 
will increase world price stability, while others defend the opposite (Idea Consult, 
1999, Boussard and Piketty, 2000). We finally want to warn for the use of elasticities 
reported in literature. A large diversity of elasticities can be found. Methodological 
problems as well as data limitations make the estimation of elasticities a difficult task 
(Demont and Tollens, 2001a). For example, there is a tremendous difference between 
the sugar supply elasticity estimates reported by Idea Consult (1999) and Devadoss 
and Kropf (1996). Instead of relying on one estimate, we include this uncertainty into 
the model by looking at all possible scenarios associated with different estimates of 
elasticities. 
 
Modelling of Pricing Strategies 
The absence of explicit modelling of pricing strategies of the input industry into the 
model is considered to be a weakness for our study in the light of the ongoing trend of 
  7vertical integration in the sector. Since no market for GM sugarbeets exists, nowhere 
in the world, no information is available about the potential demand (adoption) and 
prices. Moreover, we argue that adoption of biotechnology in the EU is influenced by 
factors (political, ideological, etc.), that go beyond the underlying economic forces. 
As a result, any temptation to model and estimate the real adoption rate and market 
equilibrium price of GM sugar beets is prone of important errors, as long as these 
non-economic forces are not being taken into account. Modelling the adoption of 
agricultural innovations and biotechnology innovations in particular is very complex 
(Demont and Tollens, 2001a). In the workshop, risk perception and cultural 
differences were correctly referred to as an important driving force for adoption (De 
Rycker, 2001). However perceived risk is only one of them among a variety of other 
factors: profitability, learning effects, complexity of the technology, etc. (Hebert and 
Goldsmith, 2000)  Attempting to model the complex system ‘technology price vs. 
adoption’ will therefore only add more uncertainty to the model, without adding any 
information. Therefore we chose not to explicitly model the diffusion process, and 
this is coherent with the objectives of the EUWAB-project, which aims at calculating 
the  benefits foregone of agricultural biotechnology innovations, due to the non-
adoption (moratorium) of these technologies. Including ‘realistic’ adoption rates will 
provide no information on potential benefits for countries that politically decide to 
ban GM crops. As a result, our welfare calculations have to be interpreted as 
functions, conditional on a given ‘normally’ S-shaped adoption curve, with a given 
adoption speed, i.e. half that of US Roundup Ready™ soybean adoption. 
Furthermore, we will carry out our analysis for a series of ‘realistic’ alternative 
technology prices and analyze the impact of all possible scenarios on the model 
outcomes. These prices, together with their probability, are assessed using expert 
  8 opinions. This approach will provide much comparable information for all EU 
countries on the benefits foregone from agricultural biotechnology.  
 
Reduction of Herbicide Costs 
A comment on De Venter et al. (2002) is that the reduction of herbicide use due to the 
new technology is overestimated. The argument is that herbicide use has been steadily 
decreased during the last decade and that the maximum potential for a further 
decrease is more or less reached. When we look at actual herbicide programmes and 
compare them with 2 or 3 postemergence glyphosate applications, still a significant 
potential for herbicide cost reduction is possible since glyphosate is relatively cheap 
and pre-emergence applications can be entirely eliminated.  
 
Another argument is the fact that the cost of traditional techniques will decline as a 
reaction on the increased competition. This effect has been included in our model 
through the conventional herbicide price decline k. The latter has also been a point of 
discussion. Should this price decline be included? The US experience shows that price 
declines are possible. This clearly shows that both technologies are being 
commercialized in imperfect markets. Because of the imperfect market, input 
suppliers are able to charge oligopolistic prices, that are higher than the prices that 
would prevail in a perfect market. Comparing transgenic seed with conventional 
herbicide-based technologies essentially shows the ‘price advantage’ of transgenic 
crops. It would make no sense to attribute the ability to price technologies at a level 
which is competitive with conventional technologies, only to the biotechnology 
industry and not to the chemical industry. Both sectors are operating in imperfect 
markets and their pricing strategies are interdependent. On a macro-economic level 
  9(Demont and Tollens, 2002), including pricing reactions essentially shifts some of the 
benefits to non-adopters. On a micro-economic level on the other hand, herbicide 
price declines erode the benefits of transgenic sugar beets for adopters and should be 
included. 
 
We fully agree that these parameters are crucial for our calculations, but observe that 
our cost reduction estimates are very consistent with literature (Burgener et al., 2000, 
May, 2000, Desquilbet et al., 2001, Lemarié et al., 2001). Another related comment is 
the fact that in Belgium a lot of paid labour is used in the weeding of sugar beets. The 
introduction of GM sugar beets would have a marginal impact on this cost item. We 
do not agree with this comment since we observe that the labour cost reduction 
associated with the elimination of only one application is important and varies 
between 0.25 and 0.44 €/ton: Table 8 in De Venter et al. (2002). Moreover, our 
sensitivity analyses suggest that changes in the number of applications are the third 
most important factor influencing the benefits from GM sugar beets: Figure 10 and 11 
in De Venter et al. (2002). 
 
Adoption of Herbicide Tolerant Sugar Beets 
One of the reviewers interestingly points out that the adoption of HT sugar beets 
would be stepwise, according to three classes of adopters. Approximately 5% of beet 
growers face tremendous problems with volunteer beets, engendering important costs 
in beet cultivation. These growers would have a high willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
HT sugar beets and would be the first to adopt this new technology. The second group 
faces high weed control costs, due to weed populations that are difficult to control. 
The third group would consist of growers that face normal weed populations, for 
  10 which it is still economical to use HT crops. Important is the fact that HT sugar beets 
are only a short-term solution for controlling volunteers. If negligence is the major 
cause, the problem will still remain after the introduction of HT crops. 
 
Shift in Weed Populations 
Important parameters for the performance of HT crops are the possibility of weed 
population shifts and the emergence and proliferation of a glyphosate-resistant weed 
population. We do not explicitly model these potential effects, since (1) no scientific 
agreement exists on the extent of these problems and (2) the inclusion of these 
parameters would only add to the much higher uncertainty in the model regarding the 
technology fee and the potential adoption, without providing more information. 
Therefore, our approach is to focus on the most important uncertainties. However, the 
effects of these problems can be assessed using our sensitivity analysis, depicted in 
Figure 10 in Deventer et al. (2002). One effect of the emergence of weed populations 
that are difficult to control would be a decrease of the yield boost, due to competition 
of the sugar beet crop with the poorly controlled weed population. A decrease of the 
yield boost with one percent would translate into a decrease of the benefits of 0,71 € 
per tonne sugar beets. Another effect would be the increase of application costs, if the 
glyphosate application is combined with additional pest control techniques (e.g. 
mechanization) due to weed resistance. These costs would simply add to the labour 
and capital costs and would further decrease the profitability of the new technology. 
 
World Sugar Price 
Another comment is the thought that the world sugar price is not relevant for the 
underlying production costs. 80% of global sugar production is sold on the domestic 
  11market at higher prices than the world market price. The world market is a residual 
market. The latter is certainly true, but despite this fact, different arguments exist 
showing that during the decade 1988-1998, the world market price was in equilibrium 
(Hannah, 1999). While the world market price is mostly irrelevant for domestically 
protected production in developed countries, this is not necessarily the case for 
developing countries (Borrell and Pearce, 1999). However, despite this fact we can 
reasonably assume that declining word prices, due to the introduction of GM beet in 
the EU and the ROW, will engender welfare effects in the ROW to at least one of the 
stakeholders. In regions where no market intervention applies, impacts will be 
distributed among producers and consumers. Regions protecting their domestic 
production through fixed prices have to cover the increasing gap between the world 
price and the domestic price by increased taxes. As a result, the taxpayer looses. In the 
end someone pays and someone benefits from declining world prices. The way these 
effects are distributed is strongly dependent on the commodity policy in place. Since 
we are mainly interested in the EU, we prefer to approach the ROW region very 
roughly by speaking about the net effect the technology will have (‘net ROW’) in this 
region, whoever pays or receives the money. For the EU on the other hand, we try to 
distribute these effects, the central aim of the EUWAB-project. 
 
Welfare Impact 
A comment on Demont and Tollens (2002) is that our most important welfare impact 
is caused by a decline of the world market price (net ROW = 53%, EU producers = 
30%, input industry = 17%). This is an interpretation error. Net ROW represents the 
sum of the benefits from GM sugar beet adoption in the ROW beet area, plus the 
consumer benefits minus the costs to ROW cane producers, both stemming from 
  12 declining world prices. ROW consumer benefits slightly overcompensate ROW cane 
producer losses, such that the global effects of a decline of the world price are roughly 
zero (0.6% of global benefits). The fact that half of the benefits go to the ROW is 
mostly due to the fact that half of global beet sugar (51%) is produced in the ROW, 
gaining from the new technology. The world price decline on the other hand, is 
essentially welfare redistribution from growers to consumers. 
 
The impact of the EU on the ROW is commented to be overestimated. We emphasize 
the fact that in our model, not only the EU adopts GM beets, but all beet regions 
together adopt the technology at the same modest adoption rate. This yields 
comparable impact estimates among all adopting regions, conditional on a fixed 
adoption pattern. As a consequence, the impact on the ROW is also conditional on 
this adoption pattern and has to be interpreted as such. Further, the only way the EU 
influences world prices is through technology-induced export expansion. Econometric 
studies show that any increase in EU’s sugar exports has a significant influence on 
world prices (Poonyth, 1998, Poonyth et al., 2000). Moreover, we only attribute the 
capacity to expand exports due to technology adoption to regions that significantly 
respond to world sugar prices. In literature, four countries are reported to do so: 
France, Germany, the UK, and Austria (Frandsen et al., 2001). We assume that only 
these four countries will expand their C-sugar exports in response to the new 
technology. This certainly is a conservative assumption and will provide us a lower 
bound of the purely EU-induced price impact. 
 
EU producers gain 34% of global benefits. A comment was made in relation to the 
definition of ‘producers’. According to the reviewers, only growers are able to benefit 
  13from the new technology. This is due to the existence of a fixed minimum price 
agreement between growers and processors, limiting any spillover of benefits from 
growers to processors through beet price declines. We largely agree with this 
statement. However, we do believe that some scope for price negotiation exists 
between growers and processors. This can be hidden in contractual agreements, 
related to quantity, quality, timing, etc. In   we try to visualize a hypothetical 
distribution of beet prices, paid by processors to beet growers, in relation to some 
characteristic φ, which can be negotiating power, timing, etc. Beet price markups are 
positively correlated with this parameter φ. The right-hand side represents the 
situation after the adoption of GM beets. As long as the price does not reach the 
minimum price yet, GM beet growers who face lower production costs will be willing 
to accept a somewhat lower price for their produce. For the same characteristic φ, beet 
prices will be somewhat pushed towards the minimum beet price, decreasing the 
variance of observed beet prices. This effect, although marginal, is the only way 
benefits can be passed on from growers to processors under the EU’s CMO for sugar. 
Figure 1
Figure 1: Negotiated Beet Prices Before and After the Introduction of a New 
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  14 Our model results suggest that EU consumers will not gain from the introduction of 
GM beets, due to the fixed intervention price stated in the CMO for sugar. The 
reviewing committee correctly pointed out that this is not necessarily due to the CMO, 
but also to the market power of the transformation and distribution sector. The French 
sugar industry for example is characterized by a CR4 
1 of 58% and a HHI 
2 of 0,12 
(Lavergne et al., 2001). Even in the absence of the CMO, this oligopolistic sector 
would absorb most price declines due to the introduction of new technologies in the 
raw (agricultural and processing) sector (Cuni, 2000), so consumers
3 would not 
benefit anyway. However, we do not agree with the argument that, since demand for 
sugar and sugar-containing products is inelastic, potential welfare increases would be 
limited anyway for EU consumers. In industrial countries it is well known that, due to 





Finally, one of the central points in Demont and Tollens (2002) is the assumption that 
exporting low-cost regions not responding to world prices have no possibilities for 
output expansion. Instead, they will respond to new technologies by freeing up land 
allocated to sugar beets, so that their total production remains unchanged. This 
                                                 
1 concentration index of the four largest firms (%) 
2 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration is defined as the sum of squared firms’ market 
shares for all firms operating on a given market. For firms of equal sizes, HHI is simply the market 
share of a firm operating on the market. 
3 direct and indirect consumption through sugar-containing products 
4 This phenomenon is known as the ‘agricultural problem’. 
  15phenomenon of land contraction in quota systems negatively affects demand for the 
new technology and explains why the input industry is not able to extract a larger part 
of the benefits. One of the reviewers correctly points out that this land contraction 
happens only once, i.e. after adoption. Once a constant level of adoption is reached, 
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